UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division

ALEXANDRE P. KONANYKHINE
Clarke-Frederick-Winchester Regional Adult Detention Center
141 Fort Collier Rd. Winchester, VA 22603

pro se, detained, indigent
Petitioner

v.

WILLIAM J. CARROLL
Immigration and Naturalization Service District Director, Washington District Office
4420 N. Fairfax Drive, Room 510, Arlington, VA 22203

Respondent.

Petitioner respectfully requests the Court to consider his outstanding motions to constitute part of this Reply

1.   Petitioner in his Petition discusses numerous and grave violations of law committed by Respondent in order to obtain the prolonged detention of Petitioner. The allegations of Petitioner are supported by the facts, the record, and the law. Respondent’s Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Memorandum"), submitted to the Court on April 24, 1997, does not address a number of grounds and addresses some other grounds exclusively by vague, declaratory, and/or irrelevant statements.

2.   Because each of the grounds, admitted (according to Rule 8(d) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) by Respondent by not contesting, warrants Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner respectfully requests the Honorable Court to grant summarily Writ of Habeas Corpus on all or several of the uncontested grounds listed hereinafter.

Such a decision will be strictly in the interest of judicial economy because it will make unnecessary the expenses on the evidentiary hearing, discovery, legal assistance, detention, and related expenses. It will also be in the interest of justice because it will terminate unjust detention of Petitioner obtained by Respondent by unlawful methods.

3.   Alternatively, should the Court consider the evidentiary hearing necessary, Petitioner respectfully requests the Court to order Petitioner’s release on his own recognizance pending the determination of the Habeas Corpus proceedings.

Such a decision will be strictly in the interest of judicial economy because it will make unnecessary the expenses on the detention. Clearly, now, when the strength of Petitioner’s claims is confirmed not only by documentary evidence but also by constructive admission of Respondent, there can be no reason to suspect that Petitioner may not appear at the hearings. It will be unfair to prolong the detention obtained by Respondent by unlawful and criminal methods, which he does not contest.

Additional considerations for release of Petitioner are listed in the unopposed and outstanding Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgement of Release of Petitioner on his own Recognizance Pending the Decision of his Habesas Corpus Petition, filed on April 8, 1997.

4.   Unsupported declaratory statements of Respondent, characteristic to his Memorandum, are vague, false, and non-responding to the specific allegations of Petitioner. For example:

4.1.   Respondent states more than once that "Petitioner has not made any showing that the Service has engaged in other than legitimate enforcement efforts" (Memorandum at 16), despite numerous specific and uncontested showings in the Petition of unlawful and criminal actions by Respondent and his agents, such as fraud, perjury, tampering with witnesses, etc.

4.2.   Respondent states that "There is not one indication that the investigation on which the Resolution [of the Russian military prosecutor] is based was outside the Russian criminal process" (Memorandum at 13-14), despite the proofs that it was illegal (See Petitioner’s Motion for a Determination of Foreign Law) and based on the fabricated documents.

4.3.   Respondent states that "There is no support for assertions that Mr. Volevodz manufactured [Greatis’] letters for the Service’ use in the immigration proceedings" (Memorandum at 14), despite clear and unequivocal statement of the CEO of the company to the contrary (See Exhibit 16) and expert’s conclusion that documents provided by Volevodz "showed evident signs of KGB manipulation". See Exhibit 59.

4.4.   Respondent states that "There is no support for [the] statement [that Petitioner] was advised not to reveal his whereabouts to [the Russian military] prosecutor after he was warned by the FBI that they had information on a threat to his life" (Memorandum at 6), despite the uncontested evidence submitted by Petitioner. See Exhibit 2.

4.5.   Declaratory statement of Respondent that "INS has not engaged in any action that would ‘undermine the legitimate operations of the INS in enforcing and administering the immigration laws’" is made despite numerous uncontested instances of fraud, perjury, tampering with witnesses, and other criminal actions of Respondent and his agents, discussed in the Petition.

5.   Respondent heavily relies on the fact that the Immigration Judge found Petitioner excludable. However, Respondent obtained this judgment by fraud, willful use of perjured testimony, fabricated evidence, false arrest, tampering with witnesses, and similar devices. The Immigration Judge refused to consider Petitioner’s evidence and expert testimonies that the evidence against Petitioner was false and fabricated for the purpose of the Mafia-ordered persecution. This and a number of similar errors are discussed in the Petitioner’s Appeal Brief. See Exhibit 64. Additionally, neither the Immigration Judge no the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") has the jurisdiction to address unconstitutional, unlawful, and criminal methods employed by Respondent in order to obtain the detention and the deportation order.

6.   Respondent heavily relies on the fact that the legal attaché and the Department of Justice chose to provide Lt. Colonel Volevodz with assistance. However, Respondent is well aware that the Department of Justice did not review or endorse any facts of Volevodz’ investigation, or even his jurisdiction; rather, the Department of Justice avoided this consideration. See Exhibits 10 and 63. As demonstrated in Petition, the legal attaché and the Department of Justice were blackmailed by Volevodz into providing this assistance. Additionally, the legal attaché admitted during his testimony that he was biased in favor of Volevodz. See Transcript of Immigration Hearing at 981.

7.   Respondent heavily relies on the fact that this Court denied ‘inappropriate reasons’ ground in the Habeas Corpus proceeding related to the first arrest of Petitioner. However, the circumstances of the second arrest are not identical to those of the first arrest, as discussed in the Petition. Respondent committed the second arrest having full knowledge that the documents he used for that purpose were fabricated, Volevodz’ prosecution was Mafia-ordered, etc., i.e. this time Respondent was willful participant of a Mafia-ordered murder attempt and related conspiracy. This and the numerous instances of criminal actions committed by Respondent and his agents (fraud, perjury, etc.) give very different spin on the ‘inappropriate reasons’ issue. That is why the determination of this Court related to the first detention may not prejudice determination of legality of the second detention.

8.   Respondent states that "[Petitioner’s] letter appears to initiate a tort action against the Government. These charges are baseless and demonstrate that Petitioner will use any tactic in his quest to discredit a legitimate law enforcement operation" (Memorandum at 7). Respondent misrepresents the facts.

Petitioner’s charges are supported by abundant evidence which Respondent does not challenge. The letter in question clearly states that Petitioner does not mistake unlawful and criminal actions of Respondent for the government’s policy, and that Petitioner would prefer to initiate the legal actions against the tort feasors and not against the government. Moreover, Petitioner indicated that he was willing to avoid any litigation, should the situation be properly resolved administratively. In any case, lawful consideration of the situation by jury may not be characterized as "will use any tactic in his quest to discredit a legitimate law enforcement operation", unlike pervasive fraud, perjury, and other criminal tactic used by Respondent in his quest to discredit Petitioner.

9.   Respondent misrepresents the facts saying that the immigration "proceedings were commenced at [Petitioner’s] own specific request and thus Petitioner waived ‘improper commencement’ ground" (Memorandum at 18). In fact, the proceedings were initiated by Respondent, and Petitioner through his counsel, starting from the very first day of the proceedings, repeatedly requested their termination. However, since the Immigration Judge did not rule on those motions, Petitioner had no choice but to participate in the proceedings, which in no case constitute waiver of the properly and timely made requests to terminate the proceedings.

10.   In part IV of his Memorandum Respondent challenges the jurisdiction of this Court to consider Petitioner’s challenges to the exclusion proceedings. However, Petitioner demonstrated that the unlawfully initiated exclusion proceedings were nothing more than one of unconstitutional and unlawful acts made by Respondent as a part of the conspiracy to commit illegal extradition. The BIA has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional challenges, thus the matter is properly before this Court.

11.   Part V of the Respondent’s Memorandum does not respond to Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner does not complain on jail administration, but rather claims that Respondent obtained his detention for unconstitutional reasons, like to serve cruel and unusual punishment for Petitioner’s anti-Mafia activities and/or alleged immigration fraud, and to deprive Petitioner meaningful access to the courts.

12.   Since most of the Respondent’s Memorandum is not responding to Petitioner’s claims, it is not necessary for the purpose of this proceeding to address each and every Respondent’s statement. However, unless a statement of Respondent is specifically admitted by Petitioner hereby or elsewhere in the record, it shall not be considered admitted by Petitioner. Particularly, Petitioner states that contrary to the statements of Respondent and Lt. Colonel Volevodz Petitioner has never committed any criminal act nor any violation of immigration laws. That is why Respondent and Volevodz resorted to fabrication of evidence, fraud, perjury, and similar devices to obtain the detention, defamation, and extradition of Petitioner.

Non-responding Memorandum of Respondent is characteristic to the immigration case of Petitioner: Respondent refused to consider specific evidence submitted by Petitioner and instead hides behind a smoke-screen of the accusations cooked by Volevodz, knowing them to be false.

In his Memorandum Respondent purports that he obtained detention of Petitioner merely exercising his discretion within the authority the Attorney General bestowed him. However, it is not true.

1.   Respondent had not power to arrest Petitioner on false pretext or for inappropriate reason.

1.1.   The power of Respondent to arrest and detain aliens is limited by the law to aliens whom he believes to be excludable or deportable. The evidence shows that Respondent knowingly and willfully arrested Petitioner for inappropriate reason - namely as an assistance to Russian Military Procuracy. Respondent had no power to do it.

1.2.   The evidence shows that on June 27, 1996, Respondent knowingly and willfully arrested Petitioner on false pretext - "overstay". Indeed, the information that Petitioner was in valid immigration status was immediately available to Respondent. Moreover, this information was originated by Respondent himself. The pretext has been admitted to be false by Respondent. Respondent has no power to arrest on false pretext.

1.3.   The evidence shows that on August 16, 1996, Respondent again knowingly and willfully arrested Petitioner on false pretext - namely, accomplishment of Petitioner’s adjustment of status proceedings. This Court had established and informed Respondent that the adjustment of status proceedings had not been accomplished. Again, Respondent had no power to arrest Petitioner on false pretext.

Thus, the detention of Petitioner by Respondent was obtained not as an exercise of discretion, but by numerous violations of law. Respondent had no power to arrest Petitioner; he committed false arrests on false charges.

2.   Even if Respondent had bona fine reasons to believe that Petitioner was in violation of immigration laws, the power of Respondent to arrest was limited by requirement to comply with existing regulation, which Respondent did not do.

Respondent did not give Petitioner a notice and an opportunity to rebut the allegations, Respondent’s agents did not advise Petitioner of his rights before questioning him, illegally searched the apartment and seized evidence, ruined Petitioner financially by defaming him internationally. As demonstrated in Petition, each and every of these violations prejudiced Petitioner and helped Respondent to obtain detention of Petitioner and the deportation order.

3.   The law provided Petitioner with the right to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Considering the facts that Petitioner had always informed U.S. government about his address, cooperated with U.S. law enforcement agencies, and that Respondent’s allegations were ill-supported and easily rebutted, it was extremely likely that the Immigration Judge would release Petitioner. To deprive Petitioner of the right to bond determination by an Immigration Judge, Respondent unlawfully placed Petitioner in exclusion proceedings.

Thus, Respondent obtained prolonged detention of Petitioner by violation of immigration procedures, not by an "exercise of discretion".

4.   In August of 1996 the issue of Petitioner’s detention was before this Court. Respondent obtained the prolonged detention of Petitioner by perpetrating pervasive fraud upon this Court and willful use of fabricated evidence.

5.   In July of 1996 Petitioner appealed Respondent’s actions to the Central and Regional offices of the INS. To obtain prolonged detention of Petitioner, Respondent committed fraud upon the United States, misinforming his superiors of the nature of his actions against Petitioner.

6.   In July - September of 1996 the Respondent’s allegations were being reviewed by the Immigration Court. If the Immigration Court established that the allegations were false, it would release Petitioner. To prevent it from happening and to obtain prolonged detention of Petitioner, Respondent and his agents resorted to fraud upon the Immigration Court, use of perjured testimony, false and fabricated evidence, and intimidation and persecution of witnesses.

Thus, the false imprisonment of Petitioner was obtained by Respondent not as an exercise of his legitimate power, but by pervasive fraud on the Court, on the Immigration Court, on the United States, and by other grave violations of the law.

The unsupported, declaratory, and irrelevant statements which constitute Respondent’s Memorandum should not divert the proceeding from the only question which is presently before the Court: did Respondent or his agents violate the law in order to obtain the detention of Petitioner? The Petitioner and the record demonstrate that so Respondent and his agents did, and Respondent does not challenge or deny the violations listed hereinafter.

1.   In section B of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that detention and deportation order were obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure.

Respondent admits the search and does not contest arguments of Petitioner other than suggesting that 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2) gives his agents the right to make search and seizure without a warrant. This argument in false: 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(2) does not give INS agents the right to search private apartments without a warrant, nor could it give such a right because it would be in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

To mislead the Court Respondent argues that the FBI search on July 2, 1996, was lawful. Even if it were true it has nothing to do with the unlawful character of the search of Petitioner’s apartment by Respondent’s agents on June 27, 1996, by which Respondent unlawfully obtained evidence used for the detaining of Petitioner and for the obtaining of the deportation order. The Respondent’s agents unlawfully seized a number of items including identification and travel documents, money, a storage receipt, travelers checks, a title on the vehicle, credit cards, professional diplomas, etc., including those he used to obtain the detention of Petitioner.

Therefore, Petitioner’s detention should be terminated as obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure.

2.   In section C of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that detention and deportation order were obtained by pervasive fraud upon the United States. Petitioner discusses a number of Respondent’s fraud actions which constitute conspiracy to defraud the United States and pervasive fraud upon the United States. Each of these instances is supported by undeniable evidence. Respondent did not deny these facts. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained by Respondent through fraud upon the United States.

3.   In section D of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that detention and deportation order were obtained by perjury. Petitioner discusses a number of actions which constitute prosecutorial perjury and prosecutorial use of perjured testimony. Respondent did not deny these facts. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained by Respondent through perjury and willful use of perjured testimony.

4.   In section E of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that the detention was obtained by pervasive fraud on this Court. Petitioner discusses a number of Respondent’s fraud actions* which constitute pervasive fraud on this Court. Each of these instances is supported by the unchallenged evidence. Respondent did not deny this fraud**. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained by Respondent through fraud on the Court.

*Additional instance of fraud by Respondent perpetrated during this proceeding is discussed in the Petitioner’s Letter in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Notably, after Petitioner filed the Letter protesting the fraud, Respondent committed almost identical act of fraud on the BIA. Specifically, Respondent claimed in his Brief in Opposition to [Petitioner’s] Appeal, filed on April 15, 1997, that Greatis USA did not respond to the Respondent’s Notice of Intent to Revoke the Immigrant Visa Petition, which would mean that Petitioner is not eligible for adjustment of status consideration. Petitioner has submitted to Respondent and to the BIA the documentary evidence that Respondent timely received the Response). See Exhibit 62.

**Respondent attempted to challenge one of the seven discussed instances of fraud on this Court, the destination of deportation fraud. Respondent sought to do this by trying to mislead the Court. Respondent, who seized the travel documents of Petitioner and ‘seriously investigated’ the case, had been well aware that Petitioner has no residence in Antigua, not even a visa to visit the country, and thus the law precludes deportation of Petitioner to Antigua. Respondent stated that he sought to deport Petitioner to Russia to be prosecuted. See Transcript of Court’s August 9, 1996, Hearing, at 73

5.   In section F of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that the detention and deportation order were obtained by intimidation and persecution of witnesses. Respondent did not challenge* these facts which constituted clear pattern of tampering with witnesses and retaliating against the witnesses. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained by Respondent through tampering with and retaliating against witnesses**.

*Respondent commented only on one instance of tampering with witnesses. Respondent did so by misrepresenting to the Court the clear threat “to put in custody at this time” made to a key witness immediately before his examination (See Transcript of Immigration Hearing at 1110) to be “a statement that Service could place [the witness] in proceedings” (Memorandum at 22). This threat resulted in that severe nervous stress of the witness which led to the dismissal of his testimony by the Immigration Judge as lacking credibility. The BIA may not adjudicate this issue of constitutional violation by Respondent.

**Additional instance of retaliating against a witness - Assistant District Counsel Ms. Rizzi - is discussed in the Petitioner’s Motion to Remove From the Record the Declarations of Respondent’s Agents.

6.   In section G of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that the detention and deportation order were obtained by denial of Petitioner’s right to cross-examine the key witness. Respondent does not contest that Petitioner was deprived of the right to examine witness Lt. Colonel Volevodz. Respondent’s assertion that this witness and evidence submitted by him were not material to the case contradicts numerous admissions of Respondent and his agents that this witness 1) initiated Respondent’s prosecution of Petitioner; 2) provided Respondent with the most of the "evidence" against Petitioner; 3) investigated Petitioner’s immigration case and interrogated the witnesses for immigration proceedings. Characteristically, the biggest part of Respondent’s Memorandum submitted to this Court on April 24, 1997, is the reciting of Volevodz’ "evidence and findings" against Petitioner. This is also true in regards of the April 15, 1997, Respondent’s submission to the BIA.

Petitioner’s right to examine key witness is constitutional and need not be proved by outlining the questions Petitioner would ask the witness. Nevertheless, Petitioner set forth in the Petition a number of important issues which required examination of Volevodz, among them his lack of jurisdiction over Petitioner, his fabrication of evidence, his fraud upon the United States, etc.

Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained by Respondent through denial of Petitioner’s right to examine the key witness.

7.   In section H of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that the detention and deportation order were obtained by unconstitutional failure of Respondent to disclose to Petitioner evidence favorable to Petitioner. Respondent sought to mislead the Court by claiming that he "promptly provided Petitioner with the Certificate" (Memorandum at 8). It is a lie. Respondent did not provide Petitioner with the Certificate at the Immigration Hearing or Habeas Corpus proceeding of August 1996. Respondent withheld and suppressed the Certificate when it was specifically requested by Petitioner under the FOIA on December 2, 1996. See INS Letter to Petitioner’s Counsel dated December 19, 1996 (Exhibit 60). When Petitioner filed the second FOIA request on February 6, 1997 (See Exhibit 61), Respondent provided Petitioner on March 4, 1997 with not more than a blank form of the Certificate. (According to 8 C.F.R. 103.10(c) FOIA request shall be answered within 10 working days and “If no substantive reply is made at the end of the 10 working day period … requesters may deem their request to be denied.”) Even to this Court Respondent submitted nothing more than a blank form of the Certificate. See Respondent’s Exhibit H. To the day Respondent has been continuing to withhold the evidence.

Respondent attempts to characterize the Certificate to be "a minor documentary recognition" made in the course of "legitimate law enforcement relationship with this agent of the Russian government". However, as the record shows, the Department of Justice believed "this agent of the Russian government" to be associated with the Mafia and strongly advised Petitioner not to reveal his whereabouts to anyone connected to the said agent. The evidence that despite this knowledge Respondent, a Department of Justice official, awarded a Mafia enforcer with Certificate of Appreciation for providing what Respondent had known to be forged and fabricated evidence* is paramount for the purpose of demonstrating the extreme bias of Respondent.

*After Petitioner filed the Petition, he obtained the evidence (See Exhibit 59) that in July of 1996 Respondent was informed by an expert hired by Respondent that the documents provided by Volevodz appeared to be typical KGB fabrication. Nonetheless, Respondent used the fabricated documents, provided by Volevodz, everywhere, including his Memorandum submitted to this Court on April 24, 1997, to persecute and detain Petitioner. Petitioner has reasons to believe that the mentioned expert examination was just one of many facts known to Respondent and the Government about Volevodz’ affiliation with the Mafia and the fabricated character of the evidence he submitted.

Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained by Respondent by unconstitutional failure to disclose evidence favorable to Petitioner.

8.   In section I of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that the detention and deportation order were obtained by willful use of forged and altered evidence. Respondent did not challenge these facts, other than by unsupported and declaratory general claims that neither he nor Volevodz did anything wrong, which should be disregarded as evasive, false and misleading. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained by willful use of forged and altered evidence.

9.   In section A of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that the detention was obtained and prosecution was instituted for illegitimate purpose. Respondent did not challenge these facts*, other than by unsupported and declaratory general claims, that neither he nor Volevodz did anything wrong, which should be disregarded as evasive, false and misleading. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained for illegitimate purpose.

*Respondent submitted the Declaration of Assistant District Director for Investigations Goldman, which is misleading and should be excluded from the record. See Petitioner’s Motion to Remove From the Record the Declarations of Respondent’s Agents

10.   In section W(3) of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that his arrests were unlawful. Respondent’s argument that the arrest on June 27, 1996, was lawful contradicts the finding of this Court and therefore does not merit reply. Respondent does not contest that he used the documents and information obtained by unlawful arrest to obtain detention of Petitioner and the deportation order. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated.

11.   In section J of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that Respondent obtained the detention and deportation order through numerous and grave violations of the arrest procedure. Respondent does not contest* claims J1, J3, J4, J6. Respondent denies claim J5 by unsupported declaratory statement which is not responding to the facts set forth in J5. Respondent challenges claim J2 by the Declaration of SA Trent. Petitioner intends to prove to the Court during the evidentiary hearing that the Declaration of SA Trent is yet another perjury of the agent. See Petitioner’s Motion to Remove From the Record the Declarations of Respondent’s Agents. The fact that Petitioner eventually called his attorney after being questioned by the arresting officers is not relevant to the fact that Respondent’s agents unlawfully obtained information from Petitioner and his wife without advising Petitioner and his wife of their rights.

*In his Memorandum on 2 Respondent claims that Petitioner had a brief release from INS custody pursuant to the order of this Court issued on August 16, 1996. This statement is false. Petitioner has never been released from custody

In any case, even non-denied violations J1, J3, J4, J6 warrant termination of the detention as obtained through numerous and grave violations of the arrest procedure.

12.   In section K of the Petition and in section B of the Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Petitioner demonstrates that Respondent improperly placed Petitioner in exclusion proceedings and consequently in detention. Respondent did not challenge Petitioner’s argument other than by non-responding arguments. For example, Respondent without explanation relied on INA (1996) § 101(a)(13)(D), which, as Petitioner demonstrated in the Memorandum in Support of Petition, is not applicable to him. Therefore, Petitioner’s argument that he is improperly placed in exclusion proceedings remains unchallenged and warrants the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

13.   In section L of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that the detention was obtained by unlawful use of 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d). Respondent does not challenge Petitioner’s argument. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unlawfully obtained by unlawful use of 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d).

14.   In section M of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that he is eligible for parole. Respondent’s arguments to the contrary are not responding to Petitioner’s claims.

15.   In section N of the Petition Petitioner demonstrates that the detention is unconstitutional. Respondent does not challenge Petitioner’s argument. Therefore, the detention of Petitioner should be terminated as unconstitutional.

16.   Similarly, Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s argument that detention of Petitioner by Respondent is based on illegitimate reason (section O of the Petition). Therefore, the Court may and should terminate the detention as based on illegitimate reason.

17.   Similarly, Respondent does not contest Petitioner’s argument that prosecution of Petitioner is in fact criminal prosecution conducted illegally (section R of the Petition). As such the prosecution and detention should be terminated.

18.   Respondent does not challenge other than by unsupported and vague declaratory statements Petitioner’s arguments that the detention constitutes capricious disregard of the public interest by Respondent (section S of the Petition), is against the public interest (section U of the Petition), violates the fair play principle (section V of the Petition), and was undertaken in bad faith (section T of the Petition). These grounds therefore also warrant the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

19.   Respondent does not challenge Petitioner’s argument that Respondent violated the due process by employing Lt. Colonel Volevodz as key INS investigator of Petitioner’s immigration case (section W(1) of the Petition). This ground therefore warrants the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

20.   Respondent does not challenge the facts revealing that his investigator Lt. Colonel Volevodz was conducting Mafia-ordered persecution of Petitioner (section W(2) of the Petition). This ground therefore warrants the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

21.   Respondent does not deny his extreme bias* against Petitioner (section W(4) of the Petition), which also warrants the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

*Assistant District Counsel Ms. Rizzi described in her Affidavit that she was afraid of retaliation by Respondent even for such cooperation normal for attorneys who intend to assist the judge to establish the truth in an efficient trial as “providing Petitioner’s counsel with exhibit numbers when he could not remember them during trial” or “allowing [Petitioner’s] counsel to view government’s exhibits during trial, when his own exhibit was being used by the witness.” See Exhibit 58 at 2

22.   Respondent does not deny that he committed unconstitutional due process violations by libel and defamation of Petitioner (section W(5) of the Petition). (Contrary to Respondent’s statement (Memorandum at 16) the Court has not considered the libel or defamation grounds. The libelous Press-release and the Statement of Respondent were considered by the Court only in the context of ‘illegitimate purpose’ ground of Habeas Corpus Petition related to the previous arrest of Petitioner by Respondent.) Rather Respondent claims that his libel and defamation of Petitioner does not merit writ of habeas corpus. However, "[o]ne’s reputation or good name is an element of liberty protected by [Fifth] amendment", Casey v. Roudebush, D.C.Md. 1975, 395 F.Supp. 60, and "[w]here the government injures a person’s reputation and in doing so effects a removal, extinguishment, or significant alteration of an interest recognized and protected by law, it must give the person his procedural due. Bartel v. F.A.A., 1984, 725, F.2d. 1403, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 297.  

Particularly, "[w]ere a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake, because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential". Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 1980, 631 F.2d. 953, 203 U.S. App. D.C. 371. Respondent held the joint news-conference with a Russian military prosecutor without giving Petitioner or his attorney any notice or opportunity to be heard. The news-conference was kept secret from Petitioner or Petitioner’s attorney, and the members of the Press were not provided with an opportunity to contact Petitioner or Petitioner’s attorney. Thus, Respondent deprived Petitioner of an important element of liberty without any due process, i.e. violated constitutional rights of Petitioner. This violation, made in malice, prejudiced witnesses and other participants of the trial, depriving Petitioner of fair trial; it ruined Petitioner financially and defamed his good name. This violation also constitutes offense under U.S. laws. It merits Writ of Habeas Corpus.

23.   Respondent does not deny that he unlawfully provided confidential information to Russian security and intelligent officers (section W(6) of the Petition) for the purpose of persecution and detention of Petitioner. This ground also warrants the release of Petitioner from the unlawful detention.

24.   Similarly, Respondent does not contest, except as by vague declaratory statements, the violations enumerated in Petitioner’s Motion for Prosecutorial Inquiry and in Petitioner’s Letter to Respondent dated April 8, 1997 (See Exhibit 53) (the same grounds).

Each and every of the above-listed grounds warrants Writ of Habeas Corpus terminating the unlawful detention of Petitioner. According to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 "A judge … shall … award the writ or issue and order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted". Respondent failed to show cause why the writ should not be granted on the above-listed grounds. Therefore, the writ should be granted on each and every of the uncontested grounds.

Respectfully submitted,

Alexandre Konanykhine

Dated: May 1, 1997